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With carriers reduced to their lowest number since 1942, maintaining forward 
presence in regions of U.S. national interest has proven difficult. The current carrier 
operating concept has resulted in unprecedented deployment lengths, shorter home-cycles 
and increasing strain on crew members and their families. By examining the Carrier 
Strike Group (CSG) deployment models and the various techniques for optimizing 
forward presence, a more efficient approach may be developed. This thesis answers the 
following question: How will the carrier’s ability to protect U.S. national interests 
through a global strategy centered on forward presence and flexible response be 
accomplished in the future? The goal is to maximize forward presence based on current 
and forecast ship-building budgets and resources by identifying the CSG’s utility and role 
in forward presence while assessing various techniques. The predicted carrier force 
structure of 11 is assumed while determining which technique or combination of 
techniques produces the appropriate level of forward presence and crisis response to deter 
current and future global threats. A combined approach incorporating a proportional crew 
swap concept with the potential to increase overseas-based CSGs will offer more options 
to policy-makers and leadership and increased flexibility in employing the CSG in pursuit 
of U.S. national interests.    
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The challenges facing the carrier strike group today are immense. As tensions 
continue to increase in the Middle East and the Asia–Pacific, the United States Navy’s 
presence through the deployment of carrier strike groups has increased despite budget 
cuts and at the expense of over-stressed crews and over-worked ships. In maintaining 
global presence with a reduced carrier fleet, carrier strike group (CSG) deployments have 
increased from 6 to 8 months, with some reaching periods of up to 10 months at sea.  
Extended deployments have increased unexpected maintenance costs and have 
overextended crews, straining military families. By examining alternatives to extended 
CSG deployments, while still meeting forward presence and operational contingency 
demands, this thesis addresses the main question: How will the carrier’s ability to protect 
U.S. national interests through a global strategy centered on forward presence and 
flexible response be accomplished more efficiently in the future? This thesis argues that, 
by examining current and previous CSG deployment models and proposed techniques for 
maximizing forward presence, a more efficient approach can be developed to optimize 
CSG presence while maintaining consistent deployment lengths.  
As a result of decommissioning the 50-year-old USS Enterprise prior to 
commissioning the new Ford class super carrier, the current fleet consists of 10 
carriers—the lowest number of carriers since 1942.1 Employing 10 CSGs under a 
deployment model designed for 11 has resulted in lengthier deployments to maintain the 
previously achieved level of forward presence. The “do more with less” mentality has 
resulted in a vicious, inefficient cycle of maintenance delays, which has extended 
deployment cycles causing further scheduling delays. This cascading scheduling effect 
has caused the Middle East to incur a three-month gap in carrier coverage for the first 
time since 2007, and a similar four-month gap in the Asia–Pacific.2 Maintaining forward 
                                                 
1 “U.S. Navy Active Ship Force Levels, 1938–1944,” Naval History and Heritage Command, January 
2016, 13, http://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/us-ship-force-levels.html.  
2 Christina Wong, “Navy Anticipates More Carrier Gaps in Middle East and Asia Pacific,” 
Thehill.com, November 2015, http://thehill.com/policy/defense/259078-navy-anticipates-more-carrier-
gaps-in-middle-east-and-asia-pacific. 
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presence in both the U.S. 5th and 7th Fleet areas of responsibility (AOR) has proven 
untenable under a U.S. policy intended for 11 carriers. While the carrier operating 
concept is based on a budget predicting an 11 carrier force structure through 2039, any 
reduction in forces below the expected level will result in a reduced level of presence and 
potential gaps in areas of sustained forward presence.3  
While reductions in the carrier fleet may be temporary, they highlight the current 
problem facing the CSG—how to manage the CSG’s present and future force structure 
while still providing the appropriate level of forward presence to effectively deter 
aggression and respond to crisis on a global scale. Because the carrier demonstrates U.S. 
military might and holds a place at the core of our maritime strategy, its decreasing global 
presence represents unchartered territory in the history of the U.S. carrier-based Navy. 
Now, more than ever, it is necessary to examine the CSG’s employment strategies to 
determine how to achieve forward presence in an increasingly turbulent future.  
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Why Forward Presence? 
In determining the Navy’s role in “forward presence,” the term itself invites 
ambiguity and misinterpretation.4 The word “forward” emphasizes the deployment of 
forces to regions of interest to U.S. national security and foreign policy. However, 
“presence” offers the notion of a presence that should be continuous and highly visible 
that also may unnecessarily place limits on the flexibility and effectiveness of the naval 
forces employed. The Navy struggles not only to define forward presence, but also to 
achieve it.5  
Despite the difficulty in defining the role, the Navy asserts that forward presence 
offers several operational advantages. Naval power-projection provided by carrier forces 
                                                 
3 Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for 
Congress, 1, CRS: April 5, 2016, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS20643.pdf.  
4 Daniel Goure, “The Tyranny of Foreign Presence,” Naval War College Review, Summer 2016, 
Proquest DOI: 60141111, 16. 
5 Ibid.  
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offers the unique combination of sea control and strike capabilities.6 The ability of a 
naval force to transform into an alternative basing platform that is less vulnerable to 
enemy attack than fixed land bases is a critical advantage only offered by carrier naval 
forces. While the Navy’s ability to demonstrate forward presence is unique among the 
armed services, its claim in shaping the international environment is difficult to support 
with evidence but also difficult to dismiss entirely.7 Regardless of the difficulties 
associated with assessing the impact of a forward-deployed Navy, its presence in war and 
peacetime has undeniably shaped the present force structure.8 In effectively allocating the 
CSG force structure to accomplish the mission of forward deployment, the role of the 
CSG and the approaches to carrier employment must be examined to offer further insight 
into how a future model may more efficiently allocate resources to maintain U.S. 
dominance in the maritime domain.  
2. The Role of the Carrier Strike Group  
The challenges facing the carrier fleet in the post-Cold War world have expanded 
beyond the single, strategic objective of the containment of communism. Since the Cold 
War, America’s continual expansion of its international aims while attempting to 
maintain a concurrent strategic presence in multiple theaters and competing areas of 
interest has challenged the carrier-operating concept’s ability to deliver forward 
presence.9 A strategy involving goal-oriented presence offers an alternative to the 
extended deployment focus that has become the preferred option in attempting to 
maximize forward presence with fewer assets. The 21st century of carrier warfare 
required a new operating concept known as the Fleet Response Plan (FRP) that would be 
unlike anything experienced by the fleet of the past and would involve a new operating 
                                                 
6 Sam J. Tangredi, “The Rise and Fall of Naval Forward Presence,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 
May 2000, 31–2, http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/3162796/fall-rise-naval-forward-presence. 
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid., 28–33.  
9 Daniel Moran, “Forward Engagement Requirements for U.S. Naval Forces: New Analytical 
Approaches,” Washington, DC: Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, 1997, 3–5. 
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approach that would require more efficient resource management—essentially doing 
more with less.10  
The U.S. Navy claims that forward presence of the CSG has enabled the United 
States to maintain power projection in defending U.S. strategic and national interests on a 
global scale.11 Although the claim that the U.S. Navy’s forward presence shapes the 
international environment furthering U.S. national interests is difficult to support with 
empirical data, the political role of an aircraft carrier in demonstrating “resolve and 
commitment” cannot be dismissed.12 In pursuing political or national interests, a 
competing view argues that “justifying forward presence in terms of the ability to shape 
the international environment raises questions of how relevant the current force structure 
is to that purpose.”13 In examining the current model, literature on the FRP and current 
Optimized Fleet Response Plan will be examined to offer potential solutions to 
maximizing forward presence with the forecasted force structure.  
3. The FRP and O-FRP  
In evaluating CSG employment strategies, the FRP and the updated Optimized-
Fleet Response Plan (O-FRP) should be further examined to offer guidance in adapting 
new techniques that may streamline carrier employment across the fleet. The previous 
FRP required constant schedule adjustment to ensure forces were ready for deployment. 
Additional adjustments were required to ensure the FRP met the life-expectancy of CSG 
platforms and in maintaining a surge capability. The implementation of the O-FRP 
attempted to address the planning difficulties of the FRP by realigning staffs, ships, and 
air wings to CSGs at the beginning of their 36-month training and readiness cycle.14 In 
                                                 
10 Benjamin S. Lambeth, American Carrier Air Power at the Dawn of a New Century, Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2005, 59–61. 
11 Jay L. Johnson, “Forward Presence Essential to American Interests,” U.S. Navy, Last modified 
August 17, 2009, 274, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id. 
12 Goure, “The Tyranny of Foreign Presence,” 16–17.  
13 Ibid., 17.  
14 Bruce Lindsey and Heather Quilenderino, “Operationalizing Optimized Fleet Response Plan– 
SITREP #1,” USNI: March 2016, https://blog.usni.org/2016/03/05/operationalizing-optimized-fleet-
response-plan-sitrep-1. 
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doing so, the goal of the O-FRP is to “create a framework for predictable deployment 
cycles with aligned and stabilized manning, stable and predictable maintenance plans, 
and ready forces fully trained to the high end level of the war-fighting spectrum.”15 In 
determining how the O-FRP plans to achieve this overall goal, the details concerning the 
plan must be further examined.  
The Navy began to phase in the O-FRP in 2014 with the Eisenhower Carrier 
Strike Group being the first to implement the Navy’s latest strategy for force 
generation.16 The plan developed by Admiral Bill Gourtney, Fleet Forces at the time of 
inception claiming that “deployments of 8 months out of 36 provide almost the same 
forward presence as that provided by deployments of 7 months out of 32.”17 The O-FRP 
claims to provide almost the same level of forward presence and force generation as the 
previous FRP model at a reduction of the cost although this is yet to be proven by the 
Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group. The Eisenhower CSG will determine if the OFRP 
strategy can be translated into success at the operational and tactical level upon its mid-
2016 deployment.18  
As the Navy adheres to a stricter schedule designed to reduce maintenance lag 
and limit the stresses on crews deployed for increasingly longer periods, gaps in coverage 
will become more common. In addressing future concerns relating to the inefficient and 
unpredictable employment model of the FRP and in reducing the proposed 8 month 
deployment schedule of the O-FRP, potential solutions to the problem will be further 
examined to offer techniques that may allow for a more balanced approach.  
B. TECHNIQUES FOR INCREASING FORWARD PRESENCE 
To maximize forward presence with current resources there are three proposed 
techniques that will be further examined to include: extending carrier deployments, 
                                                 
15 Lindsey and Quilenderino, “Operationalizing Optimized Fleet Response Plan.” 
16 Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Preserving the Navy’s Forward Presence with a Smaller 
Fleet, March 2015, 11, https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/49989-
ForwardPresence-2.pdf. 
17Ibid. 
18 Lindsey and Quilenderino, “Operationalizing Optimized Fleet Response Plan.” 
 6 
basing more ships and crews overseas, and assigning multiple crews to a single carrier 
operating from an overseas port or U.S.-based port.19  
1. Increasing Frequency and Duration of Deployments  
The first technique that has been used in maintaining or increasing forward 
presence is to extend carrier deployments although there are both advantages and 
disadvantages to doing so. The main advantage to extending deployments relates to the 
ease of which it is accomplished, with the perceived result being only additional 
maintenance time following deployment.20 Beyond the ease of scheduling however, the 
results of an increase in deployment length are felt by both the crew and ship with both 
experiencing increased stresses that adversely affect maintenance cycles and the 
operational tempo for the entire fleet as a result of the snowballing effect of a simple 
schedule change.  
One of the main concerns as a result of increases or extensions in deployment 
length is the effect it may have on crewmember retention rates. The 2014 Navy Retention 
Study determined one of the recommendations would be to “measurably reduce 
Operational Tempo,” which stresses the need for a strategy that weighs the current and 
forecast force demands with “the availability of an increasingly scarce (and decreasing) 
numbers of ships.”21 Further evidence found that a majority—62.7 percent of enlisted 
and 75.5 percent of officers—were found to strongly disagree with the O-FRP’s current 
claim that deployments will be capped at 8 months. This distrust represented in the study 
may continue to adversely affect retention rates especially if the current O-FRP exceeds 
the 8 month proposed deployment cap.22  
Another disadvantage of longer deployments is the increase in maintenance 
periods and the associated costs. According to a model that mathematically determines 
ship service life developed by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), “the effects of 
                                                 
19 Ibid.  
20 CBO, Preserving the Navy’s Forward Presence, 10. 
21 U.S. Navy. 2014 Navy Retention Study. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 2014, 
35, http://www.military.com/PDF/2014-Navy-Retention-Study-Report-Full.pdf. 
22 Ibid., 23.  
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deferring ship depot maintenance, which causes the material condition to decline and 
leads to a consequent drop in a ship’s military value.”23 Deferred maintenance was also 
found to result in increased failures and reduced overall structural integrity ultimately 
reducing a ships operational capability.24 As deployments increase and continue to 
exceed current deployment and maintenance schedules, crews and ships are suffering the 
consequences. A second method may reduce lengthy deployments offering a technique 
that provides the most forward presence of those offered although the associated 
challenges to implementation must be further addressed.  
2. Increased Forward Basing of Carriers  
According to the literature, overseas or forward-basing of CSGs offers several 
advantages to forward presence over U.S-based deployers.25 The main benefit of the 
overseas-basing of CSGs is in their increased capacity to provide forward presence 
offering triple the coverage of the same asset based state-side. While overseas basing 
increases the Navy’s presence overseas, there are several factors to be further considered 
in applying this approach.26  
There are several challenges to forward deploying more ships and crews overseas 
to include: building the capacity to operate overseas, adapting to rotational schedules and 
procedures, and maintaining the security of the forward deployed fleet overseas.27 In 
building capacity to operate overseas the major obstacle is obtaining permission from 
host governments to base U.S. forces. Even once established, basing agreements can 
change due to periodic renegotiations resulting in ships being forced to rebase and 
absorbing the associated cost of being forced to do so.28  
                                                 
23 Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), 2012 Year in Review, 27-28, 
https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/CMM-2013-U-004103-Final.pdf. 
24 Ibid., 28. 
25 CBO, Preserving the Navy’s Forward Presence, 12. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., 2. 
28 Ibid., 12.  
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An example of the difficulties associated with obtaining host country permission 
can be seen in Australia’s rejection of the recommendation by the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS) to base a U.S. carrier at HMAS Stirling, in Perth.29 
CSIS carefully weighed force posture options for PACOM based on four criteria to 
include: geostrategic security, operational force structure and management, affordability, 
and ease of execution. Despite the difficulty associated with obtaining permission from a 
host country as a forward deployed naval base, the CSIS study offers a potential model 
for evaluating overseas carrier basing options. While these criteria were used to 
determine potential basing options for the PACOM AOR, they may also prove to be 
useful in determining force posture options globally.30  
An additional challenge to overseas basing is the cost associated with investing in 
overseas infrastructure to include the exorbitant cost of establishing the requisite support 
facilities to maintain a nuclear powered aircraft carrier.31 For example, a port that is not 
nuclear carrier capable can cost anywhere from $1 billion to convert Mayport, Florida to 
$6.5 billion to convert Guam.32 Additional expenses from higher fuel and maintenance 
costs result in an estimated 20 percent greater operating cost for a Japan-based carrier 
than a carrier home ported in the U.S.33 The cost over time, however, certainly seems 
justified based on getting three times the forward presence from a single CSG.34 Another 
important consideration is the amount of cost that is offset by agreements made with the 
host country. Japan, for example, provides substantial support to U.S. bases, which offers 
a further incentive to basing there.35 The decision to base a CSG overseas cannot be 
made solely on financial costs and must also weigh the potential security concerns of a 
particular region.  
                                                 
29 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Paci-
fic Region: An Independent Assessment, Washington DC: CSIS, 2012, 74, 
http://csis.org/files/publication/120814_FINAL_PACOM_optimized.pdf. 
30 Ibid. 
31 CBO, Preserving the Navy’s Forward Presence, 12. 
32 CSIS, U.S. Force Posture Strategy, 74.  
33 CBO, Preserving the Navy’s Forward Presence, 12. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 13. 
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Overseas-based CSGs offer constant presence in regions of global security 
concern where critical long-term presence may exceed the duration offered by a U.S. 
based CSG. Overseas-based forces also offer legitimacy through regional shaping 
policies by extending commitments to host nations and regions that may further 
contribute to partnerships and maritime coalition efforts. Forward deployed naval forces 
play critical roles in peacetime or crisis; however there are challenges to overseas 
deployment. Their ability to effectively conduct operations demonstrating their forward 
presence is dependent upon the CSG’s ability to ensure security in the littorals and 
overseas deployed basing locations. Security challenges to overseas basing are increasing 
as a result of the proliferation of asymmetric and anti-access capabilities. In overcoming 
challenges related to forward presence and foreign deployed naval forces (FDNF), the 
threats must be maintained at an appropriate level and not be at the expense of 
maintaining control of the broader maritime environment.36  
3. Crew Rotation  
Literature regarding the third technique that may increase forward presence 
includes the rotation of crews among a single carrier. The concept of rotating crews is 
nothing new to the Navy, with ballistic submarines being assigned two crews since the 
early 1960s.37 Regardless of ship class, the result of rotating crews is the same—an 
increase in forward presence. When maintenance time is shared by alternating crews 
among a single ship, it is able to provide more forward presence than is possible with a 
single crew. While the concept of crew swaps when applied to the CSG presents unique 
logistical challenges especially when conducting a crew-swap overseas, it presents an 
option for further consideration that offers a substantial increase in forward presence. 
Another model for further consideration in its application for carriers is the 3.2.1 concept 
used by littoral combat ships in which three U.S.-based crews operate two ships where 
one of the two ships is constantly deployed.38 The costs and benefits associated with such 
                                                 
36 Goure, “The Tyranny of Forward Presence,” 22.  
37 CBO, Preserving the Navy’s Forward Presence, 14.  
38 Ibid., 14–15. 
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a strategy must be further assessed and the scale considered when applying such a 
strategy to the ability to conduct carrier crew swaps.  
The advantages of the crew swap concept results in more crews per ship that 
inevitably provides more forward presence than is possible through the standard one ship 
one crew construct. Swapping crews was proven through the Sea Swap concept by the 
guided missile destroyer (DDG) platform through three experiments conducted between 
2002 and 2006 by PACOM and Fleet Forces Command concluding that rotating crews 
provides an increased forward presence with minimal adverse effects.39 The main impact 
to the crews in the study was the increased effort and coordination required in ensuring a 
good turnover took place, which may simply require increased oversight by leadership.40  
The results of the Sea Swap experiments when multiple crews swapped overseas 
were found to have a 27 percent improvement over conventional deployers.41 The 
rotationally crewed ships remained deployed for a full 18 months and therefore did not 
encounter any gaps or extensions that typically occur as a result of a relief ship arriving 
late. An unforeseen advantage was found among allied and friendly navies that enjoyed 
the familiarity of working with the same ship despite the fact that the crews had changed. 
The crews also appreciated the consistency and predictability offered by the set 
deployment length of the crew-swap model, which eliminated the possibility of being 
extended beyond six months.42 An additional advantage was a reduction in maintenance 
costs incurred as a result of lengthy transits overseas although due to the post deployment 
decommissioning of the ships assessed, the study did not factor in the extensive 
maintenance that may have been necessary to get these ships deployable again.  
Despite the challenges associated with applying the crew swap concept to a 
carrier crew and air wing, the Sea Swap experiment and 3.2.1 concept are worth further 
                                                 
39 Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Crew Rotation in the Navy: The Long-Term Effect on 
Forward Presence, 2007, 5, http://www.cbo.gov/publication/19283.  
40 Ibid., 8. 
41 Ibid., 7.  
42 Ibid., 9.  
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investigating as an option for a potential carrier-based crew swap model.43 The crew-
swap model has proven to be effective for both the ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), 
DDG and littoral combat ship (LCS) platforms in increasing forward presence while 
reducing maintenance costs and crew fatigue.44 While the logistical hurdles and 
additional manpower associated with executing an overseas crew swap of a carrier may 
outweigh the benefits, the increase in forward presence of a crew-swap model offers an 
option to fill critical gaps when necessary despite the costs, and warrants further analysis 
in its application to U.S. and overseas-based carriers.  
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES  
This thesis contains three hypotheses. The first is: Through assessing the current 
and previous model for carrier fleet employment, a more efficient model can be 
developed focusing on addressing the increasing demand for the CSG to meet global 
commitments with the appropriate employment strategy based on a realistic defense 
budget.  
The second hypothesis determines that extending the current deployment length 
has adverse consequences on ships and crews, stretching resources to the point that 
operational capabilities are degraded, resulting in a reduction in forward presence. 
Extending a ship while on deployment will be found to have numerous adverse 
consequences that must be fully considered based on a careful cost-benefit analysis to 
determine the long term effects on the carrier fleet before the decision is made to extend a 
CSG.  
The third hypothesis is that an approach combining U.S.-based ships (limited to 6-
month deployments) while increasing overseas basing options, with the option to 
incorporate a carrier based crew rotation model, will increase forward presence of the 
current OFRP. In the continued struggle over limited resources, lengthier deployments 
will be proven to be ineffective in meeting long term strategic and operational objectives. 
A more realistic approach to carrier presence, combined with a more efficient 
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management of existing resources, is a demonstrably more desirable option to the 
proposed alternatives.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The plan of action for conducting research involves assessing the current OFRP 
compared to an extended deployment model and examining the proposed techniques for 
increasing forward presence including the option to establish additional overseas-based 
CSGs and the potential to implement a carrier crew swap concept. Each approach uses 
the current 11 carrier model that is based on shipbuilding budget projections and ship 
life-cycles through 2039.45 The first approach would lengthen deployments from 7 
(current OFRP) to 10 months in each 36 month operating cycle. The deployment cycle of 
all ships based overseas would remain unchanged in this approach. The second approach 
attempts to limit U.S. based ships to 6 month deployments offering the option to increase 
overseas-based CSGs and to incorporate a carrier crew-swap concept in an attempt to 
equal the forward presence provided by a 10 month U.S.-based deployer.  
With the inability to assess the impact that a reduced forward presence will have 
on U.S. foreign policy, maintaining forward presence is critical to maintaining U.S. and 
global security. Maximizing forward presence through the effective management of 
limited resources will require an assessment of the techniques offered by the literature in 
increasing forward presence and crisis response in order to determine the validity of the 
techniques and approaches to effectively employ the CSG in meeting current and future 
challenges on a global scale.  
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II. THE UTILITY OF THE CARRIER STRIKE GROUP 
To critically assess the various methods that propose to further expand the 
forward presence of the CSG, it is essential to understand the utility that contributes to its 
overall strategic value. According to the naval analyst Norman Palomar, the “survival of 
the aircraft carrier…can be attributed to…territorial independence, flexibility of striking 
power, (and) mobility.”46 By examining these attributes through evidence provided by 
historical case studies, a better understanding of the carrier’s unique role in forward 
presence may offer a more efficient method of employment in the future.  
A. STRATEGIC VALUE  
1. Territorial Sovereignty  
The carrier’s ability to continually prove its worth is largely attributed to its 
territorial sovereignty. This territorial independence was described by a Navy official 
making the assertion: “With an aircraft carrier, you get 4.5 acres of Americana with no 
diplomatic restrictions on when and what you can fly.”47 In 1996 during Operation 
Desert Strike, an official comment described the United States Air Force (USAF) as 
having been “castrated” due to their inability to launch strike fighters from Saudi Arabia 
and Turkey due to political restrictions imposed by the host countries.48  
Despite the carriers obvious advantage stemming from its inherent sovereignty, 
when defense spending is constrained the aircraft carrier becomes a target of 
opportunity—mainly by the air force. As a competitor, the carrier is viewed as a threat 
due to its high cost and its evolving mission often overlapping with roles once solely 
provided by the air force. Its ability to operate independently of land based forces and 
without political limitations has caused even its toughest critics to acknowledge the 
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CSG’s unique advantages.49 The vulnerability of fixed air bases strengthens the argument 
for carriers as highlighted by a USN naval officer in his assertion; “I can tell you where 
each of our carriers are…but given a few moments at Base Ops, I can give you the 
coordinates of every Air Force Runway…worldwide.”50 
CSGs, immune from territorial vulnerabilities have been able to contribute 
substantially to wars in South-west Asia since the turn of the millennium. As a result of a 
lack of air bases during Operation Enduring Freedom, carrier aircraft substituted for the 
lack of land based air-power. As a result, from October 2001 until March 2002, six CSGs 
flew 4,900 sorties, equal to roughly 75 percent of the 7,500 total air strikes against 
Afghanistan.51 The extreme range and difficulty in establishing bases in the Persian Gulf 
resulted in a significantly smaller contribution than the more flexible and mobile CSG 
that has demonstrated the ability to respond first to any crisis or contingency.52  
2. Flexibility  
The carrier’s ability to offer a wide range of missions as a result of the variety of 
aircraft it is able to employ enhances its flexibility and responsiveness.53 A carrier air 
wing (CVW) typically consists of a mix of 44 F/A 18 Hornet/Super Hornets, five EA-18 
Growler electronic warfare aircraft, four Hawkeye airborne early-warning (AEW) 
platforms, and around 20 MH-60 Seahawk helicopters. A testament to the carrier as a 
versatile mobile launch platform is evident in the Enterprise’s impressive 50 years of 
service in which 43 different models of aircraft operated from its deck.54  
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The efficiency and flexibility of the carrier is also demonstrated in roles other 
than strike warfare as seen in the U.S. intervention in former Yugoslavia.55 Air power 
played several important roles other than air strikes to include close air support, search 
and rescue, enforcement of the no-fly-zone and in the NATO-led Operation Deliberate 
Force.56 The carrier has proven to be a flexible and efficient option for response to 
national level crisis and contingencies, although combined with its territorial 
independence and flexibility—its mobility is another advantage that allows for its 
increased presence and response.  
3. Freedom of Movement  
With the ability to immediately respond to a crisis, the freedom of movement 
offered by a carrier is impressive. In response to a deployment order, a CSG can cover 
almost 1,000 nautical miles in a 24-hour period.57 Evidence of such mobility was 
demonstrated by the Eisenhower and Independence battle groups during the 1990 Gulf 
crisis transiting from the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans with both battle groups within 
target range if Iraqi forces within 48 hours of receiving orders to respond. As assessed by 
General Norman Schwarzkopf, “the Navy was the first military force to 
respond…and…was also the first airpower on the scene. Both of these deterred, indeed, I 
believe stopped Iraq from marching into Saudi Arabia.”58 The carriers would be the only 
assets available in theater to respond should hostilities have broken out between Iraq and 
Saudi Arabia for the first three weeks, which is the length of time it would take for land-
based aircraft to arrive in theater and be operational. Additionally, carrier aircraft would 
also provide air cover to land-based air forces arriving in theater, ensuring their safe 
deployment to Saudi Arabia.59 The limitations of land based air power during the Gulf 
War were supplemented by the joint contributions of the carriers through “their access, 
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mobility, independence of host nation support and the breadth of military 
capabilities…particularly naval aviation.”60  
The carrier’s mobile advantage was also proven during Operation Deliberate 
Force and Allied Force when land based aircraft in Italy were grounded by poor visibility 
at the airfield. The on-station U.S. carriers, however, were not impacted as they were able 
to simply avoid the weather by moving to an area not encumbered with fog enabling 
them to continue the air campaign. Speed is also an advantage of the carrier, allowing it 
to avoid enemy detection as illustrated by the Eisenhower CSG in 1991. In preparation 
for an exercise, the Eisenhower CSG steamed 7,000 nm from the Persian Gulf to the 
Norwegian Sea at an average speed of 30 knots. Consequently, the CSG was able to 
make an early advance on British air bases to their surprise as they did not anticipate the 
carrier’s ability to achieve or sustain such high speeds. Limited in its mobility only 
during replenishment periods, the carrier has the ability to respond to hotspots while 
being largely uncontested in most regions of the world. Despite the carrier’s proven 
utility, an alternative explanation relating to the carrier’s success must also be 
considered.61  
B. OPPOSING VIEWPOINT  
Although the survival of the aircraft carrier can be attributed to its proven utility 
as demonstrated through its impressive accomplishments, its deployment to relatively 
low threat areas are argued to have contributed to it being unopposed in previous 
conflicts. During the initial response during first Gulf War, there was hesitation involving 
the decision to deploy carriers to the Persian Gulf based on the perceived threat posed by 
Iraq’s sea-denial capabilities. Despite the initial threat assessment, carriers were deployed 
to the region an hour after the start of the Iraqi invasion and were immediately ready for 
combat and sustainment operations upon arrival to the AOR. The assessment of the Iraqi 
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threat, however, proved to be inconsistent with Iraqi capabilities revealing a much weaker 
Iraqi missile threat than previously anticipated.62  
Maritime forces, with a substantial contribution by carrier aviation were found to 
have “a critical role in stabilizing the initial situation, securing command of the sea, 
protecting the movement…of the heavier land-based ground and air forces, and then 
contributing to the war ashore.”63 The mobility and flexibility of the CSG set the stage 
for the land and ground forces success during the war, while continuing to provide 
support throughout the campaign demonstrating the overall value of the CSG to the 
outcome of the war.  
Another critique of the U.S. carrier’s success in war relates to operations during 
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The argument proposes that the success of 
carrier air forces against the Taliban regime was again due to the apparent lack of 
opposition. With Afghanistan not possessing a Navy due to its geography, lacking an air 
force and a limited surface-to-air capability they did not present a formidable threat to 
carrier aircraft. A further argument finds the successes attributed to aerial tanking as 
being due to the benign environment, which would have been impossible in more 
contested airspace.64 
To be fair, operating in low threat airspace does offer advantages to aerial 
refueling and strike platforms, however, it does not guarantee success. The success of 
carrier aviation beyond the maritime environment proved that U.S. carrier air power is 
capable of carrying out sustained air strikes against targets well beyond the maritime 
environment with the ability to reach hundreds of miles inland. This case offers yet 
another example of the CSG’s ability to remain flexible in meeting new requirements 
when no other service has the ability to undertake them in the first place let alone succeed 
in doing so. With the Air Force fighter missions requiring a 15-hour transit to 
Afghanistan, their contributions were mainly limited to tanking carrier strike assets. As a 
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result, the Navy was able to deliver sustainable strike power over distances never 
achieved prior, dismissing criticism of carrier aviation as being limited in its power 
projection.65  
The carrier, with its unique ability to maintain territorial independence, 
unmatched strike flexibility, and freedom of movement has proven to be a resilient and 
formidable platform capable of assuring allies and deterring adversaries. Through 
assessing the carrier’s forward presence role in relation to its attributes, while examining 
considerations related to carrier cycles that affect operational availability a more efficient 
employment methodology will ensure it remains a viable asset into the future.66  
C. CARRIER CYCLES AND OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY  
With the length of each cycle and overall model of carrier employment changing 
several times over the past few decades, examining the considerations associated with 
each cycle will help in identifying a more balanced approach to providing forward 
presence. To fully assess the impact of lengthening future deployments or extending 
CSGs currently deployed, the complex maintenance and training cycles that take place 
before a CSG deploys must be further understood. In order to balance the maintenance 
and training cycles, Navy planners must manage the deployment of CSGs to provide an 
appropriate level of forward presence, in maintaining reserve carriers to respond to 
emerging threats and crisis, and in maintaining each carrier to meet operational demands. 
To balance the various phases of the cycle in achieving an appropriate level of forward 
presence, each of these challenges must be managed throughout the maintenance, 
training, and sustainment phases.67  
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1. Maintenance Phase  
Due to the complex nature of carrier operations to include the extensive 
requirements associated with operating the ship, the integration of the air wing as well as 
the accompanying ships of the CSG, managing the maintenance and training cycles has 
proven difficult. The maintenance phase is centered on specific tasks such as midlife 
refueling and complex overhaul (RCOH), which must be performed at certain times to 
ensure a carrier reaches its operational life expectancy of 50 years. With the maintenance 
phase critical to ensuring carriers reach life expectancy goals, extended or increased 
deployments could deplete reactor fuel sooner shortening service life reducing the size of 
the fleet and consequently U.S. forward presence.68 The result of extended deployments 
has been an increase in maintenance delays as seen by the first 3 carriers to implement 
the O-FRP compressing the training phase even further and decreasing operational 
capacity and as a result reducing overall employability.69  
2. Training Phase  
The training phase of the carrier cycle is intense and demands that those tasked 
with the safe operation of the ship and air wing be allocated sufficient time for both to 
achieve their prerequisite readiness levels prior to entering the sustainment phase. To 
understand planning considerations regarding the overall carrier cycle, the relationship 
between cycle length and training phase is structured to deliver assets ready to be forward 
deployed or respond to crisis in a surge capacity.  
The training phase starts during the maintenance phase with basic training, 
ensuring the carrier crew can safely operate the ship, is watch station qualified, and is 
able to support equipment and system testing. A carrier certified to this degree may be 
tasked with operations associated with their level of training, attaining Maritime Security 
Surge (MSS) status in which they can be ready to surge within 90 days. Following being 
certified as MSS, a ship is deemed Major Combat Operations-Surge capable (MCO-S) 
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after completing a Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX) in which it can be 
made deployable in 30 days. Once complete with a Joint Task Force Exercise (JTFX), 
typically 3 months after basic training, a ship is deemed Major Combat Operations-Ready 
(MCO-R) and now fully certified for forward deployment. This level of readiness is 
sustained for 12 months to include deployment.70 This already compressed training 
schedule may be further condensed due to extending maintenance availabilities and 
overruns making it difficult to achieve operational training goals.71 The impact of 
extended maintenance availabilities and overruns was evident as the Eisenhower 
extended from 14 to 23 months requiring the Truman to complete back-to-back 
deployments to fill the gap in meeting operational demands. Such delays have ripple 
effects that impact the entire optimized carrier schedule.72  
3. Impact of Lengthening the Operating Cycle  
Increasing the length of the operating cycle over time has had several effects on 
forward presence as the employment model has adapted by increasing deployment 
lengths. As cycle length increases the proportion of time a carrier is deemed deployable 
increases as a result of a reduction in the amount of time spent in maintenance. Typically 
with one deployment per cycle, the proportion of time actually deployed decreases as 
cycle length increases.73  
Reducing deployment length however, may translate into an increased availability 
in responding to crisis and contingencies. The reduction of the carrier fleet combined 
with increasing cycle length from 24 months under the FRP to 36 months under the O-
FRP will continue to challenge the Navy in meeting forward presence demands. As 
tensions throughout the world continue to increase, developing and managing an efficient 
carrier cycle will directly affect our ability to project power and influence through 
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forward presence while maintaining a global response to crisis and contingencies.74 The 
challenge becomes how to balance the management of assets to meet both the desired 
level of forward presence while maintaining the ability to respond to crisis and 
contingencies of national interest.  
To maximize forward presence with current resources there are several proposed 
techniques to further examine, including: extending carrier deployments, basing more 
ships and crews overseas, and assigning multiple crews to a single carrier operating from 
an overseas port or U.S.-based port. Through applying these techniques to a goal-oriented 
and targeted-readiness strategic outlook toward forward presence, a more efficient 
method of fleet management may be developed.75 The proposed techniques are not 
necessarily intended to be applied individually as a single solution, but simply offer 
methods to develop a more efficient management approach as an alternative or to be 
integrated as a means of improving the existing employment model. In providing a more 
consistent forward presence, each technique will be further assessed to determine the 
advantages and potential challenges associated with integrating the proposed methods to 
offer a more efficient employment strategy for the carrier fleet. 
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III. RETHINKING FORWARD PRESENCE 
With the carrier force budgeted to remain at 11 through 2039, a shift in focus to 
presence with a purpose rather than simply marking time offers a better use of available 
resources by limiting deployment length while increasing the sustainment or surge period 
and therefore the ability to respond to international crisis and contingencies. Admiral 
Vern Clark described goal-oriented presence in his remarks as CNO, “I would rather 
muster two strike groups for three months and do something really significant 
internationally than just go over and hang out for six months.”76 Goal-oriented presence 
combined with a targeted readiness approach offers a more prudent use of resources, 
although it relies on commanders to assume a level of risk associated with accepting 
adequate readiness levels in responding to crisis with the potential to have less than 
optimal readiness.77  
Targeted readiness involves reducing readiness levels in less-critical mission 
areas while maintaining critical mission areas such as Strike and Carrier Air Support at 
peak readiness levels.78 As indicated by a fleet-wide message, “in many instances, absent 
indications of imminent danger or war, intermediate levels of readiness are not only 
acceptable but a prudent use of resources.”79 Targeted readiness offers an alternative to 
the peak levels of readiness that were prerequisites for a CSG deployment during the 
Cold War. Maintaining crews at adequate readiness levels while reducing deployments to 
6 months will allow for increased funding during the sustainment phase increasing the 
CSG’s response to international crisis and contingencies in moving toward a more goal-
oriented approach to forward presence.80  
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A. EXTENDING CARRIER DEPLOYMENTS  
As the Navy attempts to get the most out of its resources, policies governing 
deployment duration and quality of life have evolved to meet forward presence demands. 
To understand the difficulty facing Navy leadership and policy-makers the constraints 
governing the employment of a CSG must be further understood. The Navy Personnel 
Tempo Operations (PERSTEMPO) Program establishes procedures in an effort to 
manage how much time a Sailor is deployed. The goal of the program is to balance 
operational requirements with quality of life considerations for individual Sailors.81 This 
goal is often difficult to achieve as deployments increase in length and PERSTEMPO 
guidance is revised to accommodate the increasing length often at the expense of a 
Sailors quality of life.  
1. Balancing OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO 
The Navy Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) Program establishes the necessary 
procedures to manage the frequency and duration of deployments while balancing a 
ship’s maintenance, material readiness and training to meet operational requirements. In 
meeting current global force management presence demands, the Navy has established 
deployment lengths of 8 months in length increasing from the 6 month limit set by the 
program during the Cold War.82  
Since 1985, the Navy has attempted to address concerns relating to PERSTEMPO 
by reducing the stress on Sailors and ships by attempting to limit excessive deployments. 
While this approach was effective in managing the operating model at the time, a more 
precise management model took shape in 2000, establishing limits relating to the time 
Sailors could be deployed while compensating personnel who exceeded the limit.83 
Despite this compensation, the events of September 11, 2001 required the waiver of 
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certain PERSTEMPO management provisions to include suspending compensation for 
those individuals exceeding the high-deployment threshold of 220 days.84  
While a state of national emergency being declared by the President of the United 
States violates OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO restrictions, in this instance it was due to 
operational necessity. In the absence of crisis however, OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO 
should be used mainly to assess the condition of the force to influence force management 
and readiness practices while effectively managing stress on the fleet.85 As 
PERSTEMPO guidance has allowed an increase in the acceptable duration a unit may be 
away from home port, quality of life for Sailors and families has been adversely 
affected.86 As a CRS report highlighted the long term impact of increasing OPTEMP 
“Over time, the continual wear on personnel and their families may result in difficulties 
retaining and recruiting high quality volunteers.”87 According to this, the policies that 
establish the activity rate of a unit and the amount of time a service member is engaged in 
such activity away from homeport have a direct impact on the retention of our Sailors. 
Establishing a balance between operational and personnel limitations regarding a unit’s 
time away from homeport will require a model that ensures future resource 
recommendations are made considering a short and long-term risk analysis to global 
force management.88  
2. Impact on Retention Rates  
The Navy has increasingly used the technique of increasing the length and 
frequency of deployments to quickly boost forward presence. While necessary in times of 
crisis, this practice has been relied upon heavily since 2007 as indicated by data reflecting 
that nearly half of all aircraft carrier deployments lasted 7 months or more from 2007 to 
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2013. Of these, a majority of those deployments over 7 months were unscheduled with 
Sailors being told of the extension while at sea.89  
The unpredictable nature of deployment schedules was cited as the primary 
concern for Sailors up for reenlistment in a study assessing reenlistment post-1986. 
Additionally, it determined that more frequent deployments have an influence over the 
decision to reenlist reducing reenlistment rates by 1.9 percentage points. Although longer 
deployments were not found to be a clear indicator of a decline in reenlistment, as 
extended deployments become routine they are more likely to adversely affect 
reenlistment rates.90  
3. Proposing a Solution  
Developing a solution to curb declining reenlistment rates is difficult, although 
compensating Sailors through allowances and offering competitive salaries may help 
offset the burden of lengthy deployments. Through offering a combined incentive that 
ensures “high-deployment” allowances are maintained for deployment periods that 
exceed 6 months while offering salaries that exceed those offered by the civilian sector 
Sailors may be persuaded to stay Navy despite the occasional lengthy deployment.91 An 
alternative to the extended deployment option, which may increase forward presence 
while lessening the manpower impacts that result from continual lengthy deployments, 
involves increasing the posture of overseas-based CSGs. An examination of the potential 
to increase the overseas-basing of carriers and the application of a crew rotation concept 
may propose a solution to the extended carrier deployment that has increasingly become 
the norm.  
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B. OVERSEAS BASING OF CARRIERS 
Forward-homeporting or overseas posturing of ships and even strike groups is 
nothing new for the Navy and has proven to be one of the most effective ways of 
maximizing forward presence in regions identified as being of interest to our national 
security. While the Navy’s primary forward-homeport location for a CSG has been Japan, 
a number of other ships have been successfully homeported to other forward locations 
more recently to include: Italy, Spain, Guam, Diego Garcia, and Bahrain. The Navy has 
forward-homeported a CSG to Japan since the early 1970s with it representing the largest 
concentration of naval forces based overseas.92 With the benefits of homeporting ships 
overseas resulting in a threefold increase when compared to an asset based state-side, the 
challenges associated with overseas-basing need to be further addressed in an attempt to 
mitigate and manage the risks and limitations associated with deploying a CSG 
overseas.93  
1. Overseas Basing Risks  
There are several risks to consider in determining the feasibility of basing a CSG 
from an overseas location to include both political and operational risks. The strategic 
benefits of forward presence do not come without a certain degree of risk. The first of 
which includes the political risks that stem from agreements made with the host nation. 
These may include restrictions that may be imposed on U.S. naval forces by a host nation 
limiting the scope of naval operations afforded to overseas based assets. Consequently, 
these restrictions may reduce the operational flexibility of naval forces in carrying out 
their full range of missions and as a result limit the range of options available to U.S. 
policymakers.94 To fully evaluate the risks associated with overseas-basing, the political 
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and operational risks as well as the associated costs must be identified in order to mitigate 
the risks while attempting to reduce the costs.  
a. Political Risks  
As political risks are magnified in times of crisis they have the potential to 
outweigh the forward presence benefits of basing additional CSGs overseas. For 
example, basing agreements made with host nations may inhibit the ability to respond to 
a crisis or contingency in another region due to the perception of the host nation and 
regional partners seeing such an action as a reduction in U.S. assurance.95 In contrast, 
there is always the potential for eviction due to host nation policy changes, which can 
adversely affect U.S. forward presence and alter fleet wide schedules impacting the 
overall carrier deployment model.96  
 With it difficult to predict the behavior and attitudes of host countries, there will 
always be political uncertainties associated with the decision to base forces overseas. 
These unpredictable risks are often difficult to manage although they can be mitigated to 
a certain degree by U.S. influence and the ability to exert power in a particular region.97 
In addition to its influence in foreign politics, transferring a CSG from a U.S. home port 
to an overseas location could also have a negative impact on U.S. domestic politics 
impacting the local economy. The economic impact to an area that was once supported 
by CSG Sailors, spending their pay on local goods and services could be devastating. In 
addition, the impact to ship maintenance facilities that base their entire existence on the 
CSG’s maintenance schedule could also be at risk.98 These economic effects translate 
into domestic political concerns for the constituents of the areas most affected by the 
CSGs departure.  
Although the foreign and domestic political risks associated with CSG basing 
considerations will remain, they can be managed by striking a balance between U.S. and 
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overseas basing. In addition, diversifying overseas locations to build relationships and 
assurances in multiple countries in politically sensitive regions will help mitigate the risk 
of access being denied during crisis or contingencies.  
b. Operational Risks  
The recent introduction of long-range precision-guided weapons has placed forces 
and bases that were once beyond reach, now within weapons range of China with North 
Korea and Iran not far behind, investing in similar capabilities. 90 percent of U.S. air 
bases in Northeast Asia to include the CSG based in Yokosuka, Japan are well within the 
envelope of China’s current ballistic missile threat.99 With China’s DF-21, nicknamed 
the “carrier killer,” having a range of 15,000 km, the missile pushes the CSG beyond its 
effective strike range arguably diminishing its strategic importance in the region.100 The 
Congress commissioned National Defense Panel in 1997 highlighted this concern stating, 
“precision strikes, weapons of mass destruction, and cruise and ballistic missiles all 
present threats to our forward presence, particularly as standoff-ranges increase.”101  
Overseas basing increases forward presence and as a result the threat level for an 
asset not only to operations but also due to additional force protection threat that results 
from being based overseas. U.S. military installations overseas will always be vulnerable 
to terrorist attack, although arguably U.S military installations based on American soil 
also face a similar asymmetric threat. The threat of attack remains low, however for an 
underway CSG as one author illustrated the point by making the inference that it would 
be easier to drive a delivery truck containing weapons of mass destruction to the 
Pentagon than to deliver the same package to a carrier in the middle of the open ocean.102 
A pier side carrier however, demonstrates similar vulnerabilities in comparison to land 
based installations although CSGs maintain one distinct advantage—the ability to get 
underway if the threat level increases. A carrier air wing similarly, when not embarked on 
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the carrier and conducting flight operations from an overseas host nation airfield, exhibits 
similar vulnerabilities as well as operational limitations typically only experienced by 
aircraft based from overseas airfields.103  
Such operational restrictions imposed by a host nation may include the denial of 
overflight and even the denial to take off by U.S. aircraft. A case evident of both was 
experienced during the U.S. response to Iraqi troop movements during Operation Desert 
Strike II in late 1996. As a result of U.S. land-based aircraft being denied overflight by 
Syria and Turkey and land-based aircraft in Saudi Arabia being denied political clearance 
to take-off in support of Desert Strike II, the ENTERPRISE CSG operating in the Adriatic 
Sea was called upon by the National Command Authority (NCA) to respond to support 
the CARL VINSON CSG in the Arabian Gulf. This case highlights the CSG’s value as a 
flexible, mobile, territorial independent force capable of responding to the NCA when 
land-based air forces are either stuck on deck or denied overflight, neither of which 
prohibits the operational freedom enjoyed by the CSG.104    
In addition to these threats, the increased prevalence of space-based surveillance 
systems that enhance imagery, communication, and positional accuracy will continue to 
increase the vulnerability of our forward deployed forces.105 The advent of such threats 
also stresses the importance of periodically reassessing our overseas force posture and the 
level of forward presence in regions with increasing threat levels.106 Since Anti-
Access/Area-Denial (A2AD) weapons systems and enhanced satellite surveillance 
continue to pose a threat to overseas bases and ports, the ability to mitigate the impact of 
regional threats is critical although to do so the costs relating to overseas basing must be 
further examined.  
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2. Overseas Basing Costs  
The financial cost associated with establishing or improving existing facilities and 
infrastructure must be determined when considering future overseas posture changes. 
First, the condition of existing facilities needs to be determined to assess whether further 
investment is necessary and cost effective.107 In addition to the current condition of 
prospective basing options, the renovation and modernization of existing facilities to 
accommodate a CSG would have to factor in the additional costs of operating a ship 
overseas to include: additional sea pay due to an increase in deployment status; increased 
fuel prices; as well as greater maintenance costs.108  
a. Fixed and Variable Costs 
In addition to operational costs, the cost of operating overseas bases to include the 
fixed and variable recurring costs also factor into force posturing decisions. The fixed 
costs of operating an overseas base ranges from $50 million to $200 million annually, 
dependent upon service and region while recurring adjustable costs are based on the size 
of the base.109 Based on these determinations, the RAND study on overseas basing found 
that the fixed costs of operating a base overseas are no higher than facilities based state-
side (with the exception of Air Force bases), although the recurring variable costs were 
found to be higher among bases in more developed regions to include Europe and the 
Asia–Pacific. The recurring variable costs were found to be higher in these regions due to 
the higher standard of living resulting in increased allowances associated with the “cost 
of living, permanent-change-of-station move costs, and the need to provide schools more 
comprehensively.”110 The range of cost per individual based overseas varied from 
$10,000 to almost $40,000 annually based on service and location, dependent ratios, the 
local cost of living, and type of housing available. To manage the associated cost of 
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overseas posturing, methods to reduce the operational and basing costs must be further 
assessed.  
b. Cost Reduction Methods 
 To reduce the associated costs with overseas basing there are two proposed 
methods, centralizing overseas bases and establishing presence through a rotational basis. 
While centralizing overseas bases offers a reduction in overall cost, the strategic 
advantages offered by the continuous presence of an overseas based CSG should not be 
overlooked. The flexibility offered by an overseas based CSG in its ability to quickly 
establish itself as a mobile airfield in the desired region offers a presence that rivals the 
distributed force structure offered by multiple U.S. overseas air bases. Regarding the 
second cost-cutting approach, despite the benefits that a rotational presence offers, it is 
the wrong approach to establishing CSG presence in a region for a number of reasons.  
As the pressure to reduce permanent forces stationed overseas continues to 
increase, rotational presence is seen as the cost-saving and more efficient alternative 
despite its inability to deliver on either of these claims. The savings that result from the 
realignment of permanent forces from a base does not offset the cost of providing full 
presence through rotational deployments while keeping the base open. With net savings 
dependent upon the ability to move equipment for prepositioning, moving the requisite 
equipment it takes to support a CSG into and out of theater on a rotational basis would 
require resources exceeding those necessary to keep the base open continuously.  
If the rotating presence model is further applied to overseas bases, especially in 
Japan where the United States only forward based CSG is homeported, it may initiate 
false perceptions concerning U.S. commitment to our strongest ally in the region.111 
While rotational presence was offered as a means to cut costs and increase presence to 
support the U.S. “pivot” to the Asia–Pacific, the military resources referred to as “key 
elements we’ve historically needed in this part of the world for crisis response,”112 by 
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Admiral Locklear, as CNO testifying before Congress addressing the rotational presence 
requirement in the Asia–Pacific. He goes on to conclude that these key elements “have 
not been available to the level that I would consider acceptable risk,”113 Establishing the 
permanent presence of a CSG in regions of national interest demonstrates U.S. 
commitment and builds trust and credibility among regional states while deterring 
adversaries.114 With the associated risks and costs having been addressed, the advantages 
must be examined to fully assess the overall value of overseas force posturing. 
3. Benefits of Overseas Basing  
Historically the Navy has based a small proportion of its fleet outside the 
continental United States. Basing or posturing of naval forces overseas increases 
opportunities for forward engagement offering more options, both political and military 
in response to threats and crisis in regions of U.S. interest. With forward-deployed naval 
forces uniquely skilled in the mission of forward engagement, their permanent basing 
overseas magnifies their overall presence in a region.115 The significance of the Navy to 
this purpose is evident in the Navy’s proposed force structure.116 The Navy is planning to 
increase its number of battle force ships based overseas from 29 to 44 ships by the end of 
2024. The intention to increase overseas posture demonstrates the Navy’s value in 
providing political assurance in carrying out U.S. defense strategy.117  
The Department of Defense strategic guidance stresses the need to constantly 
reassess its capabilities and make adjustments in order to ensure success in its core 
mission areas.118 These capabilities enabled by overseas presence include, “improving 
operational responsiveness to contingencies, deterring adversaries and assuring allies, and 
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facilitating security cooperation with partner militaries.”119 An examination of each of 
these benefits or capabilities must also be considered in order to assess the enduring need 
for overseas presence in making current and future overseas posture recommendations.  
a. Response to Crisis and Contingencies  
 The strategic benefit of increased contingency responsiveness of an overseas-
based CSG lies in its increased flexibility to respond in times of crisis. With a U.S. 
strategy focused on the global security environment and ensuring capabilities and posture 
decisions are in alignment with this strategy, the broad maritime presence of a CSG will 
enable a flexible and rapid response to crisis offering protection of U.S. interests and 
allies.120 The degree of flexibility offered by a CSG operating from an overseas base 
exceeds that of an overseas airbase, which may be restricted in a crisis by the host nation. 
These restrictions may include limiting overflight clearance or airfield operations to 
include the number of landings allowed—these restrictions however, do not apply to a 
CSG’s air wing in international waters.  
A CSG based overseas also offers diversity to its global presence allowing for a 
range of alternatives to be leveraged in ensuring operational effectiveness is maintained 
in the event overseas based airfields become restricted in a crisis. Maritime forces with 
the ability to provide air support complement ground forces in regions of growing 
concern. Overseas-basing allows the U.S. to maintain a broadly distributed maritime 
presence enabling the rapid response of critical capabilities when necessary.121 Not only 
does a flexible and rapid response enable overseas-based forces to more effectively 
respond in times of crisis, this level of presence and response also serves as a deterrent to 
adversaries in the region while assuring our allies.  
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b. Deterrence  
The permanent presence of U.S. forces in a region demonstrates a level of 
commitment to the security of an area that furthers U.S. national interests in a particular 
region beyond that of a typical deployed force.122 Credible deterrence as defined in the 
Priorities for 21st Century Defense, “results from both the capabilities to deny an 
aggressor the prospect of achieving his objectives and from the complementary capability 
to impose unacceptable costs on the aggressor.”123 Overseas posturing contributes to 
deterrence, although not all overseas bases and forward capabilities offer the same level 
of deterrence. The extent to which forces in a region are able to provide relevant 
capabilities increases their credibility in a region through their ability to provide stability, 
protect U.S. interests, and protect the global commons.  
The permanent presence offered by an overseas-based CSG in its ability to project 
power throughout the maritime domain and beyond, gives it a deterrent value unique 
among the armed services and even in the Navy. In the maritime domain, the ability to 
challenge A2AD claims by states such as China and Iran will be accomplished through 
the persistent presence and power projection offered by an overseas-based CSG.124 In its 
deterrence role, the benefit of permanent overseas presence offers assurance to our allies 
furthering U.S. influence in shaping the strategic environment.125 
c. Assuring Allies and Partners  
Assuring allies through constant military presence in a region influences the 
strategic decision-making of both allies and adversaries. The absence of such assurance 
would result in different strategic choices by the dominate powers in a region that may 
perceive a lack of presence to be a lack of interest by the U.S., consequently altering the 
regional balance of power.126 An alliance strengthened through the permanent presence 
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of U.S. forces helps maintain the balance of power by increasing the combined military 
strength of the alliance and in turn the ability to deter aggression among regional 
adversaries.127 While an increase in presence, especially permanent presence overseas 
may increase the CSG and fleets vulnerability, one can argue that the absence of presence 
or worse—the withdrawal of permanent overseas forces threatens U.S. security by losing 
the strategic influence necessary to maintain allies and prevent adversaries and aggressors 
from advancing their interest and position in a particular region.128 With the physical 
presence of a CSG in an ally’s territory being a critical factor in fostering alliances and 
building influence in regions of interest, the deterrent value offered by an overseas based 
CSG cannot be overstated.  
The ability to respond quickly with certain capabilities contributes to the level of 
deterrence a force projects in a region. CSGs, Amphibious Readiness Groups 
(ARGs)/Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) offer a combination of rapid response and 
core capabilities that enable U.S. presence in unstable regions through combat aircraft 
and amphibious assault. Overseas based forces further expand the deterrent posture in a 
region through their influence within the international system. The alliances achieved 
through assuring allies and partners further legitimize the U.S. use of force in a region 
therefore contributing to both its deterrent and assurance value.129  
d. Regional Security Cooperation 
Overseas basing of U.S. forces allows for additional opportunities to interact with 
foreign militaries beyond those offered by temporary deployments. These opportunities 
allow for increased cultural awareness not only by military personnel but also by their 
accompanying military family members. The cultural benefits that result from the 
interaction with forces and families residing overseas with allies and partners are 
accomplished to a great extent by the overseas basing of forces. For U.S. forces to 
advance U.S. interests and influence through building and maintaining international 
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coalitions, an understanding of the customs and traditions of all coalition partners is 
helpful. While the cost of basing forces overseas is considerably higher than U.S. based 
forces, the increase in the frequency and scale of security cooperation activities 
contributes to regional security and furthers U.S. influence that would not otherwise be 
possible. Security cooperation constitutes only a marginal cost of overseas based forces 
with these activities being combined with basic unit training contributing to overall 
readiness.130  
While overseas basing is beneficial to security cooperation among smaller 
regional partners it has the most benefit when applied to security cooperation efforts with 
more advanced militaries. By strengthening relationships between individuals and units 
among the more advanced military partners in Europe and the Asia–Pacific, 
interoperability is enhanced in the region while bilateral and multilateral training 
capabilities are also increased.131 This ability to combine security cooperation activities 
with core training requirements results in an increase in interoperability among partner 
nations that would not occur otherwise. The cost argument states that “while the 
incremental costs of security cooperation activities are lower with U.S. forces based 
overseas, the savings are not close to sufficient to offset the higher costs of basing forces 
overseas.”132  
Since the greatest level of security cooperation results from the multinational 
training opportunities that are available through maintaining overseas bases in Europe 
and the Pacific, increasing or at the very least maintaining overseas bases is critical to 
maintaining security cooperation. An increase in overseas basing of CSGs would allow 
for increased flexibility, enhancing regional activity and as result security cooperation. 
The relationships and professionalism that develop through frequent interactions between 
overseas based forces and regional allies and partners is enhanced by the continuous 
presence offered by an overseas based CSG. Replacing overseas-based forces with U.S.-
based deployers may threaten regional relationships and the current level of experience 
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that enables security cooperation and provides balance to regions of interest to U.S. and 
allied forces.133  
With the costs and risks of overseas basing identified, possible solutions may be 
offered to mitigate risk and reduce costs to appropriate levels in determining the scale of 
overseas-based presence required to balance threats and allies in regions of interest to 
U.S. national security. To further assess overseas force posture, the 4 main benefits of an 
overseas based CSG include: the increased responsiveness to crisis and contingencies, the 
ability to deter adversaries while assuring allies and the stabilizing influence offered 
through security cooperation in the region.  
Based on these advantages while minimizing costs and mitigating risks, the 
continued presence of overseas based forces gives the United States a strategic advantage 
in places where aggression would be considered a potential threat to U.S. security 
interests and our allies. While increasing the number of overseas-based CSGs offers a 
method to increasing forward presence and consequently influence in a region, an 
additional approach involving crew rotation must be further evaluated to determine its 
utility when applied to the CSG operating concept.  
  
                                                 
133 Lostumbo et al., Overseas Basing, 22–3.  
 39 
IV. CREW ROTATION  
With the advantages of basing more ships and crews overseas identified, crew 
rotation not only makes overseas basing possible, but extends the presence of ships 
permanently on-station through the crew swap concept. The ability to deploy ships for an 
extended period of time only pulling in to port for required maintenance, port calls for the 
crew and to conduct turnover is only possible through crew rotation. As mentioned 
previously, crew rotation is a proven method of increasing forward presence by 
alternating crews among a shared naval platform. Proven among the SSBN, LCS, DDG, 
and Mine Warfare platforms to increase forward presence while reducing maintenance 
costs and crew fatigue—crew rotation may offer a viable approach to increasing the 
forward presence of the carrier and air wing while reducing overall cost.134 In assessing 
the potential application of crew rotation for the CSG, the benefits and challenges to 
implementation must be further assessed.  
The overall purpose of crew rotation is to increase the duration a ship spends 
operating overseas in its forward presence role. As the Navy’s shipbuilding budget 
continues to be the target of increasing budget constraints, a reduction in the size of the 
fleet will require more presence from fewer assets.135 Consequently, a smaller 
shipbuilding budget would prevent the Navy from expanding its presence during a 
prolonged crisis beyond current forward presence levels.136 While an approach involving 
a multiple-crew concept offers additional forward presence, the exact amount of added 
presence depends on the method of crew rotation. Based on a CBO analysis, a dual or 
multi-crewed construct was found to provide between 1.4 and 1.8 times the presence of 
the traditional single-crew concept.137 To assess the impact of crew rotation on the 
forward presence of the carrier, the benefits and limitations of the traditional single-crew 
concept must be further assessed. 
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A. TRADITIONAL SINGLE-CREW CONCEPT   
Aside from the overseas-based CSG in Yokosuka, Japan, the Navy’s standard 
crew concept for carriers involves one crew operating one ship from a U.S.-based port. 
Under the current O-FRP, the overall cycle length is set at 36 months, of which 35 weeks 
are spent deployed, just shy of 9 months. The remainder of the cycle is spent in 
maintenance, training, and sustainment.138 There are several factors that affect the 
amount of time a ship actually spends forward deployed to include: deployment length, 
ship transit speed, duration of port calls, crew training proficiency, maintenance 
requirements, and the ability to maintain readiness levels of surge capable forces. The 
end result being a U.S.-based ship will spend only 20 percent of its time deployed in the 
AOR. As a result, it takes 6 ships to maintain a continuous forward presence to a region 
over a period of 2 years.139  
1. Benefits of the Single-Crew Concept 
As most carriers are based on either the East or West Coasts of the United States, 
they spend a considerable amount of time transiting to their overseas area of operation, 
time which could be better utilized for forward presence by incorporating crew rotation. 
While transits to an area of operations do extend deployment length and the associated 
costs of doing so, they are of benefit to the crew and the overseas economies in which the 
port visits take place.140  
One of the few perks of a naval deployment involves the opportunity to visit an 
overseas “liberty port.”141 Since the average first-tour Sailor has never had the 
opportunity to experience another culture and all the sights, sounds, and tastes that go 
along with a port call, these rare opportunities are typically remembered as the highlight 
of deployment. In addition, the benefit that 5,000 Sailors and Marines eager to spend 
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their hard earned sea-pay have on the local economy is another important benefit of a 
traditionally deployed CSG. To include port visits, it may take a Navy ship between three 
and six weeks to arrive in an area of operations although; this may be reduced by 
increasing speed and minimizing stops en route as necessary when responding to a crisis 
or contingency.142 Despite the benefits of the standard CSG deployment that are mainly 
attributed to the unique ability of naval forces to conduct port visits, assessing the 
benefits of rotating crews will highlight some of the limitations of the standard CSG 
deployment model.   
2. Challenges Associated with the Single-Crew Concept 
The traditional single-crew concept under the O-FRP was developed with the 
intention of enabling the carrier fleet to remain flexible to the changing demand for 
carrier presence.143 To achieve a desired level of forward presence, schedulers must 
balance maintenance, training, deployment, and sustainment with the increasing demands 
from the COCOMs for additional carrier presence. This is accomplished by attempting to 
meet the 6+1 goal of having at least six carriers deployable within 30 days and an 
additional carrier able to deploy within 90 days. The challenges associated with 
scheduling a single-crew carrier are increasing as the carrier fleet decreases and tensions 
throughout the world continue to escalate. Crew rotation offers an additional tool that 
must be further examined in its potential to give schedulers and planners the necessary 
flexibility to develop a more comprehensive carrier operating concept. 144 
B. ASSESSING CREW ROTATION 
Rotational crewing has several advantages over traditional deployments with the 
main benefit being an increase in forward presence while maintaining consistent 
deployment lengths. As a result of a ship remaining overseas in an AOR, crews are able 
to be swapped out consistently at set intervals as they are not subject to delays typically 
encountered as a result of a relief ship’s late arrival. Under a standard deployment model, 
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the delay of a relief carrier to an area where maintaining forward presence is a 
requirement results in the on-station ship being extended until the relief ship arrives. This 
typically has a trickle-down effect that impacts the schedule of the entire carrier fleet.145  
1. Sea Swap Experiments  
The success of crew rotation is evident in the Navy’s Sea Swap experiments that 
was conducted among DDGs from 2002–2006. These experiments aimed to keep a 
destroyer forward deployed longer through swapping crews on a set six month 
schedule.146 The Sea Swap concept offers an option to reduce the amount of time spent 
transiting by deployed ships. The concept involves deploying ships for 12 to 24 months 
while rotating crews every 6 months.147 The relief crew transits to a host nation port by 
aircraft where the two crews conduct a turnover to include a familiarization of the area 
and ship before their departure. The crew returning to the United States would assume 
duty on the relief crew’s ship, ultimately swapping ships in the end.148  
The results of the Sea Swap experiments were mainly positive, siting the 
reduction in maintenance costs associated with eliminating lengthy transits and the 
resulting increase in forward presence as the main benefits. Other advantages included a 
ships ability to remain deployed continuously for up to 24 months. There were, however, 
a few negative side effects. First of all, while crew morale and readiness were found to be 
the same compared to other ships, retention rates were actually found to be lower on Sea 
Swap ships. This was supported by a CNA study that surveyed Sea Swap participants 
finding, “crew members participating in the experiment who were surveyed viewed the 
concept negatively and indicated they would be less likely to stay in the Navy if all 
deployments were conducted this way.”149 This negative view is likely attributed to the 
high turnover rate and lack of ownership among crews for the Sea Swap ships. Crew 
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ownership of their vessel is engrained in the Navy’s culture and history creating a strong 
connection between a ship and its crew.150  
A single crew typically lives, trains, and maintains a single ship and as a result 
develops a tremendous sense of pride and ownership for her, which may be absent among 
multi-crewed ships. This lack of ownership may translate into reduced maintenance 
efficiency. An example of this can be seen when a repair is required close to the turnover 
period. A crew expecting to be relieved soon may put off a repair in order for it to be 
accomplished by the relief crew. Conversely, the single-crew model gives the crew no 
option whether to complete the job or not forcibly creating ownership among the crew.151 
The negative effects relating to a reduction in the retention rate due to a lack of 
ownership could potentially be mitigated through an increased level of effort by Navy 
leadership to ensure the requisite level of coordination takes place to allow for a smooth 
turnover between crews instilling a sense of ownership among multiple crews for the 
same ship.152  
2. Challenges Associated with Crew Rotation 
There are additional challenges to the multiple-crew concept, including 
considerations for different training procedures and additional maintenance requirements. 
Transitioning from single to a multiple crewing option involves additional personnel and 
therefore updated training programs. Incorporating a multiple-crew concept would 
involve additional trainers and recruitment specialists. The associated maintenance and 
repair costs would also increase, with service life decreasing as a result of lengthy 
operating periods with minimal maintenance.153  
As a result of extended deployments, the carrier’s nuclear power plant and hull 
would also wear out sooner, altering the ships fixed service life and retiring ships sooner 
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than expected affecting shipbuilding plans.154 To better accommodate the required 
increase in personnel, support services, and maintenance programs, several adjustments 
would need to be made to the existing single carrier support structure. First, maintenance 
periods would need to be shorter and more intense. The challenge associated with 
achieving the required support personnel to provide training, recruitment, and 
maintenance for multiple-crews increases with the size of ship. Despite the challenges, 
the aircraft carrier being the most expensive ship in the fleet may benefit from the 
advantages and efficiency of rotating crews.155   
In summary, the Navy declared Sea Swap a success in terms of “ship days on 
station, total costs, ship maintenance and material condition, and crew re-enlistment rates 
during deployment.”156 Navy officials also determined the Sea Swap experiments to be 
the most effective among ships with, “high demand but low numbers.”157 Additionally, 
the experiments were found to be even more beneficial when a particular class of ship is 
scheduled to retire due to maintenance costs following the deployment cycle not being a 
concern. With the Ford class scheduled to replace the aging Nimitz fleet with one hull 
being built every 5 years through 2044, the benefits discovered by Sea Swap relating to 
reduced maintenance among ships scheduled for decommissioning could be applied to 
each Nimitz class carrier as they are retired.158 The Navy concluded from the Sea Swap 
experiments that more can be gained from its high-demand and high-cost ships by 
rotating crews among them rather than building more ships to meet increasing demands. 
As the need for the forward presence of these ships increases, the Navy should consider 
incorporating a crew rotation model as a tool to increasing forward presence among the 
carrier fleet.159   
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C. APPLICATION TO THE CARRIER  
As a result of the successes of crew rotation, the Navy has expressed that applying 
Sea Swap on a fleet wide basis may help in reducing the size of the fleet while managing 
presence concerns.160 While the benefits of Sea Swap are clear, the framework to include 
measurable objectives, goals, and outcomes is still in development. Once developed, this 
framework would then have to be revised to assess the viability of various rotational 
crewing options on the carrier. An example of an effective framework for crew rotation 
can be seen among the SSBN community that includes detailed policies and procedures 
for accurately turning over a ships condition with measures built in for accountability. 
Without such a framework and a lack of detailed guidance, the Navy will be unable to 
effectively transition a ship between rotating crews, especially as the complexity of such 
procedures increases with crew and ship size. Additionally a cost-effective analysis must 
be conducted to assess the potential impact of carrier crew rotation on crew morale, 
operational requirements, and ship maintenance.161  
1. Effect on Maintenance  
The effect of rotational crewing on carrier ship maintenance is another important 
consideration that must be further examined. Ensuring carriers are able to remain 
deployed for 12 to 24 months will require a strategy that incorporates the best 
maintenance practices from the combined lessons learned of previous crew rotation trials 
conducted on various platforms. As crew rotation is still an evolving process, its 
implementation has been focused mainly on proving its feasibility, which has allowed for 
a variety of maintenance approaches in an attempt to prove the crew rotation concept on 
each individual platform.162  
The main challenge of operating a ship continuously for up to 24 months is 
achieving the operational capability achieved under a system in which maintenance 
periods occurred previously every 6 months. Based on a CNA assessment, a ship’s 
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condition at the conclusion of the Sea Swap experiments was assessed to be 
“comparable” to another ship that had recently returned from a standard 6 month 
deployment. Upon closer investigation of Navy inspection data, however, a GAO report 
found the Sea Swap ship to have more deficiencies and worse inspection ratings when 
compared to the 6-month deployer. As a result, the study concluded that if the Navy 
intended to make crew rotation a standard practice it “should review the maintenance 
process and assess maintenance responsibilities, relationships, and costs.”163 Additional 
evidence of the need for further analysis was demonstrated by the rotational crewing 
experiences of coastal patrol ships that did not receive more focused maintenance, which 
could have adversely affected the ships operational capability. Without effective 
maintenance strategies that address these concerns, the Navy risks not being able to 
maintain ships at the required readiness levels that enables crew rotation to benefit ships 
and Sailors.164 
2. Developing a Framework 
Once an analytical framework has been established by conducting a thorough cost 
benefit analysis, an approach involving the rotation of carrier crews can be implemented 
and further tested in its ability to provide forward presence at a reduced or acceptable 
cost. One such approach was introduced in which a carrier would be allocated 125 
percent of its required crew of which 25 percent would rotate at 2 and ¼ month intervals. 
The Navy further agreed that applying some basis of the Sea Swap concept throughout 
the fleet would allow the fleet to be reduced from 290 to 375 ships down to a range of 
260 to 325 ships.165 Since U.S. Navy officials are asserting that to fully meet the 
presence demands requested by the regional COCOMs, the fleet will have to be expanded 
to 450 ships, investigating a solution involving the rotation of crews among high-demand 
platforms is critical to effectively managing the Global Force Management Allocation 
Plan (GFMAP).  
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3. Managing the Carrier Fleet  
The process by which decisions are made regarding how to best employ a finite 
number of resources among competing COCOM interests, referred to as the GFMAP has 
resulted in lengthening the deployment of critical assets to include carriers.166 To manage 
this increasing demand for the forward presence of carriers and better distribute limited 
resources through the GFMAP, crew rotation offers a potential solution to help manage 
the Navy’s approach to forward presence fleet-wide.167 While rotational crew models 
have proven effective in keeping a ship forward deployed for extended periods, the 
logistical challenges encountered when moving large crews overseas combined with 
training difficulties have proved difficult to overcome. Training difficulties result from 
slight platform configuration differences that are not all represented accurately among the 
available ship simulators. In order for crew rotation to offer a viable solution to overseas 
presence these limitations would need to be addressed. A solution targeting base-line 
configuration training on simulators state-side while rotating only a proportion of the 
crew would alleviate large logistical challenges and offer a solution targeted at managing 
limited assets to improve the carrier’s forward presence.168 An example of crew rotation 
among carriers was conducted with success during the swap of three different carriers by 
rotating only a portion of a core crew among the various ships.  
4. A Carrier Crew Swap  
The crew swap technique, while not as common among CSGs, is not a foreign 
concept. The Reagan, Washington, and Roosevelt successfully executed a 3 carrier hull 
swap that involved more than 9,000 Sailors in safely repositioning crews and ships while 
conducting forward presence and forward engagement missions throughout their transit 
to their ultimate destination. The plan transitioned a core crew of 1,400 Sailors 
nicknamed the “Three President’s Crew” between three hulls while successfully 
transferring Sailors among 3 different homeports—Yokosuka, San Diego, and Norfolk—
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resulting in more than half of the Sailors ending up at their assigned homeports at the 
completion of the transit. While the 3-way hull and crew swap was focused mainly on 
repositioning ships and crews to their newly assigned homeports and overseas duty-
stations, it also resulted in forward engagement opportunities for the Reagan as she 
transited around South America and for the remaining ships to continue with their 
assigned maintenance and deployment phases.169 The result of such efficient planning 
and resource management offers an option that will ultimately result in an increase in 
forward presence through careful planning and resource management. Only through 
assessing the various approaches as demonstrated throughout this thesis, can a more 
efficient carrier employment concept be developed to maximize resources in achieving 
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V. CONCLUSION  
The Navy’s ability to project forward presence relies on formulating a U.S. 
strategy that links the appropriate size and force structure with demands from regional 
COCOMs and policy makers. As the demand and force structure of the Navy and carrier 
fleet changed dramatically from the post-Cold War, the carrier employment model has 
adapted mainly by scheduling lengthier deployments or extending current deployments. 
Such a reactionary model lacks the planning necessary to allow for a more 
comprehensive approach that matches a strategy centered on forward presence and crisis 
response with available resources. The only consistency in developing such a model is 
the changing nature of conflict and the certainty that the Navy and CSG will continue to 
play a predominant role in shaping the future of warfare through its forward presence.  
The combined utility of the carrier and air wing allow for unmatched power 
projection. The CSG’s strategic value is defined by its attributes. These attributes to 
include territorial sovereignty, flexibility, and freedom of movement enable it to employ 
capabilities that make it a unique strike platform immune from the limitations and 
vulnerabilities of land-based strike fighter bases. Capabilities that give it its power 
projection also give the CSG its deterrent value in which its mere presence is enough to 
influence an adversary’s decision-making. Its stabilizing effect is also attributed to its 
flexibility in adapting to carry out a variety of missions other than strike and its mobility 
in responding to crisis and contingencies. Through a distinctive set of attributes and 
capabilities, the CSG is an ideal forward presence platform with a proven ability to adapt 
quickly while remaining strategically positioned and ready to counter emerging threats. 
Despite the advantages offered by the carrier, examining carrier employment cycles 
revealed a model that relied on extending deployments to fill presence gaps mainly due to 
maintenance cycle delays. Extended deployments were also found to increase 
maintenance costs and potentially reduce life expectancy goals. An alternative approach 
proposes reducing deployment length through the more efficient allocation and 
management of resources while incorporating two main techniques to increasing forward 
presence. 
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To achieve the increasing demand for forward presence, extending deployments 
only offers a temporary solution that ultimately results in gaps in overseas coverage. 
Reducing deployments, however, was found to increase a CSG’s ability to respond to 
crisis or contingencies due to an increased sustainment period. While this doesn’t always 
translate into an immediate increase in forward presence, it allows U.S. forces the ability 
to maintain the highest level of readiness (MCO-R) longer during the sustainment phase 
offering a more targeted approach to forward presence. By rethinking forward presence, 
an alternative focused more on presence with a purpose rather than marking time offers a 
better use of constrained resources. Combining a more prudent use of resources with a 
strategy focused on increasing overseas carrier basing locations while implementing a 
carrier crew rotation concept gives planners and policy makers more options and 
flexibility in employing a CSG.   
The most measurable benefit of overseas-basing is the 3 fold increase in forward 
presence when compared to CSG based stateside.170 An increase in forward presence, 
however, does not come without associated challenges to include risks and costs which 
must be assessed and mitigated through conducting a cost-benefit analysis in assessing 
potential basing locations. The measurable variables to include the costs associated with 
operating a carrier overseas far exceed those of operating U.S. homeported carriers even 
when comparing the cost of homeported vs. overseas presence. A model for assessing the 
viability of overseas carrier basing locations similar to the CSIS study that assessed 
HMAS Perth as a potential U.S. carrier homeport must be utilized. The CSIS study offers 
a model to be emulated when weighing force posture options based on criteria identified 
as essential to the success of overseas forces based in a particular region.  
The benefits of an overseas based CSG are immeasurable. Since the advantages of 
overseas-basing also include intangible benefits such as increased cultural awareness of 
both foreign and U.S. armed forces as well as the cultural exchanges of accompanying 
family members, a cost-benefit analysis may overlook the benefit of certain latent 
variables. For example, although it is difficult to quantify the deterrent value of overseas 
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based forces, it must be considered in the analysis. While it seems apparent that the 
CSG’s role in deterring adversaries and assuring allies is demonstrated mainly through its 
overseas-based commitment, this may be difficult to support through empirical analysis. 
Despite this, it is difficult to disprove that overseas-basing combined with the increased 
forward presence of a CSG gives the U.S. more influence in shaping the international 
environment, in turn furthering U.S. interests in a specific AOR. Regardless of these 
difficulties, the latent variables relating to overseas presence of a CSG offer advantages 
that collectively contribute to U.S. strategic influence, which although may be difficult to 
discern through analysis must be considered and factored into the decision-making 
process. As overseas-based CSGs offers an option for policy-makers and military 
leadership to increase forward presence, a rotational crew concept offers an approach to 
complement overseas-based forces in allowing for the maximum potential forward 
presence to be gained through a combined approach.   
Crew rotation concepts to include Sea Swap are used by overseas forces 
successfully although the carrier has yet to benefit from a CSG focused crew swap 
model. As crew rotation continues to evolve in its application to larger platforms to 
include carriers, the benefits will become more apparent. While a comprehensive cost-
benefit analysis is difficult to conduct with respect to overseas-basing, an analysis 
involving crew rotation in its application to the carrier is yet to be conducted. Such 
analysis must be conducted based on a model derived from the lessons learned from the 
experiences gained from other platforms. Since it is difficult to fully develop a crew swap 
model for the carrier based on the lessons learned from smaller platforms with fewer 
Sailors and therefore fewer logistical concerns, a proportional crew swap model may 
offer a testable solution to assess the merits of the concept when applied to the carrier.  
To develop a framework to consistently manage the rotational crewing among 
carriers, guidance and proven practices must be incorporated from platforms that have 
demonstrated success with crew rotation to include the SSBN and DDG platforms. Only 
through developing and utilizing the lessons learned from existing crew rotation models 
and experiments will the Navy be able to avoid previous mistakes in applying an 
effective crew swap framework to the carrier. Once a framework is developed, its 
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application to the carrier can be tested on a proportional level to see if it achieves the 
measurable goals and operational objectives established by the framework’s guidance. 
Through only rotating a certain percentage of the crew for a set duration, logistical 
challenges will be alleviated while reducing deployment duration experienced by the 
individual crewmembers. Additional oversight and accountability of the carrier crew 
swap concept will be required to ensure a culture of ownership is maintained among 
crews in order to effectively manage crew morale, operational capacity, and maintenance 
costs. A solution may be found in increasing carrier manning above 100 percent allowing 
for the additional crew to rotate aboard at set intervals, however in order to be successful, 
streamlining home-port simulator training among the varying platform configurations 
will need to be incorporated into the model. Addressing this training requirement will 
ensure the requisite level of knowledge and training is maintained among crews prior to 
rotating aboard. In addition to training, the maintenance cycle under a proportional 
crewing model will require a carrier to remain at seas for extended periods that may 
require a revised maintenance strategy that balances extending ship deployments while 
not degrading overall ship life. Achieving such a balance is important to ensure crew 
rotation is getting maximum return on investment for its forward presence.          
A combined approach allowing for the increase in overseas presence and crew 
rotation offers policy-makers and leadership to include the national command authority 
more options and therefore increased flexibility in applying the Navy’s role in forward 
presence to maintain and pursue U.S. national interests. However, more planning and 
foresight is necessary if we are going to meet forward presence demands with current and 
forecast ship-building budgets and resource constraints while attempting to limit 
deployments to a more reasonable 6 month duration. Limiting deployments through 
effective planning and resource management offers the ability to meet and possibly 
exceed current forward presence levels.  
By thoroughly examining all possible options to maximizing forward presence of 
the carrier fleet, the Navy can rebalance budgets, operational capabilities, and the overall 
deployment process in ensuring it takes care of its most valuable asset—its people. An 
emphasis on planning instead of the tendency to react with a quick fix involving a 
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deployment extension is needed to avoid critical gaps in overseas presence. Designing a 
fleet wide architecture that incorporates proven approaches allows for the combined 
strengths of each to collectively manage forward presence concerns. In doing so, each 
platform and CSG will expand its forward presence role through adapting its capabilities 
to meet and exceed operational requirements further refining the fleet employment 
concept resulting in its continued evolutionary progress.  
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